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Normativity in communication research is indicated in identifying a problem, a theory, or 
a methodology; in interpreting empirical data; and in acknowledging a scholar’s 
association or affiliation with a particular school of thought. However, scholars are often 
not aware of—or do not acknowledge—their normative assumptions, resulting in the 
exclusion of audiences from their arguments. This article, therefore, in arguing for an 
explication of norms in communication research, distinguishes among three levels of 
normativity, discusses the legitimacy of norms at those levels, and introduces a framework 
that enables scholars to reflect on their norms, an action that will help them to further 
compare, bridge, and synthesize different perspectives, theories, and methodologies in 
communication scholarship. 
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Worldwide, an acknowledged understanding of the importance of scientific research to national 
economies, to societies’ well-being, and to public health has upped the ante for research institutions and 
independent investigators to engage more in value-added, society-relevant research programs grounded in 
normativity. But it is not only studies with a far-reaching impact on national policies or media systems that 
follow certain norms, as enunciated by Gattone (2012): 
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Any analysis of social science must begin with the observation that social research does 
not take place in a vacuum. It always emerges in a specific context, with particular 
constraints and opportunities and within the framework of specific cultural norms and 
conventions. (p. 176) 
 
The purpose of this article, then, is to establish the case for scholars to increasingly elaborate and 
explicate norms in communication research. It argues that social science research is, to a great extent, 
normative and that communication research is not an exception in this context. How to communicate effectively 
during a crisis, how to communicate credibly in an international context, and how journalists can address social 
issues responsibly and ethically are some of the fundamental questions that communication research seeks to 
answer. It also criticizes, cultivates, improves, and transforms social practices. In addition, it suggests solutions 
to social problems and drives professionalization, as does research in other forms of the social sciences (Craig, 
1996; Law & Urry, 2004; Littlejohn, 1999; Zima, 2007). 
 
Nyre (2009), while calling for an “instructive attitude towards mass media and communication” (p. 
4, emphasis in original), observes that communication scholars “have a moral duty to use our knowledge in 
an attempt to improve public communication” (p. 11). Similarly, Brosius (2003) describes communication 
research as an “empirical normative social science”2 (p. 411) more influenced by normative demands from 
society than from other disciplines. Given its practical orientation, communication research could have an 
opportunity to demonstrate stronger normativity than the other social sciences. As will be shown presently, 
taking the micro-meso-macro framework of German sociologist Schimank (1996, 2010), normativity is 
present and originates at various levels. The Schimank model was chosen because it describes how the 
potentially infinitely large space of possibilities for action is restricted by generalized orientations for action 
that manifest themselves in social structures. 
 
Normativity in the social sciences in general, and in communication research in particular, is not 
only restricted to normative advice that scholars have offered on effective social practice. Norms already 
influence, explicitly or implicitly, the selection of a problem, a theory, a method, as well as an interpretation 
and a representation of research data, even in empirical, number-crunching research. However, the mere 
attention to a certain social problem is rooted in the scholar’s normative framework. As Coleman (2013) 
states, “Social scientists can never simply describe the world as it is, but, through their choice of questions, 
methods and interpretations, contribute to the construction and classification of social reality” (p. 90). For 
instance, while examining the framing of homosexuality and heterosexuality in the media, communication 
researchers assume, implicitly or explicitly, that this conforms to the principle of equality, making it a sine 
qua non that journalists ought to report in a nondiscriminatory manner. This “oughtness” manifests 
normativity—as both a norm-setting and a norm-applying attribute of research. But only seldomly do 
communication scholars themselves or other scientists reflect on the normative underpinnings of their work 
(Blumler & Cushion, 2014). An issue here is the palpability of normativity, a point noted by Hansson (2014), 
who complains that in many disciplines, normativity is played down and concealed instead of revealed. In 
part, this can be explained by the fact that very often, scholars are not aware of their own normative 
assumptions (Weber, 1949) and the different levels of normative influence. Rather, they are cautious not 
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to damage their so-called value-neutral empiricism with too much normativity (Althaus, 2012). For this 
reason, scholars often try to present their research as objectively as possible, a practice Völker and Scholl 
(2014) describe as “objectivism” or a “strategy of argumentation based upon ontological premises and 
realistic epistemology, including normative consequences” (p. 142). Usually, a scholar’s first attempt at a 
brief normative forecast is described at the end of a research article, often “as throwaway lines in an 
empirical study’s concluding discussion or as preparatory throat-clearing before an empirical study is 
introduced” (Althaus, 2012, p. 97). However, to meet the global challenges of the expanding field of 
communication, scholars must clarify and reflect on their own norms within a diversity of perspectives and 
a pluralism of frameworks (Scheufele, 2011). By suggesting that, Scheufele contributes to a discussion first 
elucidated by Weber’s (1949) argument for value-freedom in the social sciences and the subsequent value 
judgment dispute,3 or Werturteilsstreit and positivism—the political-philosophical dispute between the 
German critical rationalists and the Frankfurt School about the methodology of the social sciences. It argues 
that scholarship “is inextricably embedded in the historical contexts, social values, material interests, and 
social struggles that produce and constitute it” (Jansen, 2002, p. 11). This, for example, is indicated in 
studies demonstrating that the age of researchers and a negative attitude toward youth are predictors of 
negative attitudes toward video games (Ferguson & Colwell, 2017). 
 
We use Scheufele’s appeal as a point of departure in this article and intend to present a framework 
that supports scholars in reflecting on the norms that influence their own work. Thus, this article is organized 
into five parts. The first delineates levels of normativity in the social sciences. The second discusses the 
functions and legitimacy of norms at these levels in social sciences and addresses why norms should be 
explicit—a normative demand in its own right. Adopting the micro-meso-macro framework of German 
sociologist Schimank (1996, 2010), the third introduces a framework that describes levels of normative 
influence on the individual scholar. Throughout, we proffer examples from communication research, 
particularly from journalism research, a problematic field in this regard. The fourth critically describes 
practices associated with various subdisciplines, schools of thought, and research traditions in 
communication research. The last part presents the extent to which this perspective contributes to the 
advancement of communication research worldwide. 
 
A Three-Level Approach to Identifying Normativity in Communication Research 
 
Analyzing norms poses challenges in light of the multiplicity of meanings engendered by that term, 
particularly across academic disciplines limiting, as it were, the chances for a consensus on social norms 
among scholars (Hechter & Opp, 2001; Interis, 2011). As Stemmer (2008) observes, “At least, a modest 
convergence lies in the fact that normativity is often associated with the idea of compulsion. Something that 
has normativity develops a compulsion to act” (p. 12). We therefore define norms as a group’s imaginings 
of conditions that regulate behavior. Thus, the norm-setter, promoter of norms, or norm-sender expresses 
an expectation of how a norm-addressee (i.e., the target of the normative statement) ought or ought not 
to behave or perceive something. Hence, norms cannot be right or wrong, only valid or invalid. Their function 
is to ensure behavioral regularities that offer a guarantee for certain behavior and, accordingly, constitute 
social systems. Norms are general because they do not address a specific person, but rather all members 
                                               
3 Even as Weber talks about values, he refers to a larger class of normative statements (Albert, 2006). 
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of a community sharing a specific feature, such as a nation or a group of scholars (e.g., communication 
researchers; Morris, 1956; Opp, 2001). 
 
For analyzing norms in the social sciences, it is necessary to separate levels of normativity that in 
practice may not be discrete, but that—on an analytical level—should be delineated.4 We suggest, therefore, 
a three-level approach: empirical, object related; theoretical; and metatheoretical (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Three Levels of Normativity. 
Empirical, object-
related level 
The empirical study of norms: 
Norms and values of the scholar’s research object (e.g., the journalist) 
• Social norms (macro level) 
• Norms and values of an organization (meso level) 
• Individual norms and values (micro level) 
Theoretical level Scholars as norm-setters: 
Scholars develop or enhance existing norms and values of the research objects 
(micro and meso levels) and give normative advice on social issues (macro 
level). 
Metatheoretical level Scholars as norm-addressees: 
In their research, scholars are influenced by social norms and values. 
• Social norms (macro level) 
• Norms and values of their research institution, research group, or 
school of thought (meso level) 
• Individual norms and values (micro level) 
Scholars as norm-addressees and norm-setters: 
Norms of scientific practice, recruitment, scientific education 
The meta-analysis of scientific norms and values: 
Norms and values of research disciplines as research objects of metatheoretical 
studies 
 
First, norms are an object of empirical research, as are those for the practice of public relations or 
journalism. They are analyzed with regard to how they manifest in practice and how journalists or public 
information officers comply with them. This is accomplished through empirical methods such as content 
analysis, guided interviews, or experiments (empirical, object-related level of normativity). In this article, 
we address secondarily this level with regard to the norms of nonscientists as research objects, but 
substantially discuss it with regard to the norms of scholars at the metatheoretical level. 
 
Second, on a theoretical level, scholars mostly implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, apply or even 
enhance social norms or norms of a professional practice (theoretical level of normativity). Many theories imply 
                                               
4 Rothenberger and Auer (2013) made a first attempt at this. 
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norms and value judgments because they are based on a certain conception of the self. The uses-and-
gratifications approach, for instance, allocates autonomy to the individual. Objectivity is an example of an 
explicit guiding principle in journalism research. Many scholars have conceptualized objectivity as the 
outstanding occupational norm in journalism (e.g., Schudson, 2001; Skovsgaard, Albæk, Bro, & de Vreese, 
2013; Vos, 2012). Waisbord (2013) identified several norms implicit in our “Western” apprehension and ethical 
guidelines of what is “good, professional journalism” in a democracy: “As a normative concept, professional 
journalism is typically associated with the kind of reporting that follows the ideals of modern, ‘Western,’ 
particularly U.S., journalism, such as objectivity, fairness, and public interest” (p. 7). However, in non-Western 
countries, he identified many other occupational practices and normative standards. 
 
In this regard, Grunig’s (1989) two-way symmetrical communication model is also an illustration 
of a normative model (theoretical level) in public relations research because it “explains how public relations 
should be practiced” (Grunig, 2001, p. 13, emphasis in original). Similarly, citizen journalism studies (e.g., 
Allan & Thorsen, 2009; Burns, 2008; Kim, 2011; Lewis, Kaufhold, & Lasorsa, 2010) are often explicitly 
oriented toward the assumed democratic potential of the Internet. Several guiding principles such as 
democracy and participation, based on a Habermasian idea of a deliberative public sphere, are therefore at 
the forefront of the analyses of citizen journalism: These guiding principles are built on the idea that the 
participation of citizens in news production and distribution enhances political participation, which leads to 
a “democratic shift” (Markham, 2009, p. 4) and ultimately creates new “power” that opposes the well-
practiced hierarchical structures of classic news production. Citizen journalism is thus constructed as a 
“normative activity” (Kim, 2011, p. 2). In China, from another normative point of view, it could be 
interpreted by the powers as a threat to the status quo. 
 
Third, from a metatheoretical perspective, norms also influence and guide scholarly research 
(metatheoretical level of normativity). Norms prevalent in a society, in a certain research institution, or 
in a research team, as well as those guiding an individual scholar, influence scientific practice. Certain 
European Union and other European government-subsidized institutions are, for example, the most 
important donors of external funding to various European research associations. In return, these funding 
institutions expect a commitment from funded institutions and individuals to be guided by certain 
democratic, pro-European norms that are then enhanced through the scientific work that commits to 
them (see theoretical level of normativity). As such, scientific norms inform scientific practice, be it in 
the form of self-proclaimed tasks or in certain requirements for the quality of scientific practice, and by 
the theories and methods adopted for conducting a scientific study (e.g., Hathaway, 1995; Popper, 2002; 
Slawski, 1974). There are scientific norms that are applied in a number of disciplines, as well as those 
that guide and influence a coterie of researchers in specific fields (e.g., in the social sciences; 
Weingartner, 2006). 
 
As a standard practice, one also finds traces of normativity in the mission statements of various 
communication research associations. The Environmental Communication Division of the International 
Communication Association mission statement, for example, states, “It will help communication scholars 
improve the environmental performance of their universities, the media industries, and environmental 
organizations. The group will support members to integrate sustainability issues into their teaching and 
promote research in this area” (International Communication Association, n.d.) Such a mission statement 
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mirrors the existing practices through which researchers belonging to a research association or institution 
prescribe their own behaviors. 
 
A more special norm discussed in the social sciences is value-freedom. Weber (1949) argues 
(certainly normatively) that scholars ought to make their norms and values explicit: “to keep the readers 
and themselves sharply aware at every moment of the standards by which they judge reality and from which 
the value-judgment is derived” (p. 59). 
 
Finally, if theoretical or metatheoretical levels of normativity in research are research objects 
themselves (e.g., Popper, 2002; Ritzer, 1991), these studies can be called meta-analyses of normativity. 
From that perspective, this article is, for the most part, a meta-analysis. 
 
Functions and Legitimacy of Normativity in Communication Research 
 
What follows from this conceptualization of normativity in science is the question on its legitimacy 
because, in a methodological sense, norms, like values, are judgments, or “ought statements.” Such 
judgments could be observed on the object level, and their representation in the context of object-related 
research are acceptable because they are articulated by the research objects as undertaken, for example, 
by journalists and by public relations or advertising practitioners. In fact, if communication research does 
not exclude parts of a social practice, then its norms and values must naturally be the object of empirical 
investigation. 
 
At the metatheoretical level, norms of scientific work that impose requirements on the quality of 
scientific practice and on the theories and methods resulting therefrom are indispensable: “In order that 
scientific research activity be able both to ever reach its aim (truth or approximate truth) and to more 
efficiently reach it, it must be organized or regulated by methodological rules or norms” (Weingartner, 2006, 
p. 58). According to Tranøy (1980), their function is to justify and to steer, to act as guiding and legitimating 
principles for actions and decisions. The technical norm of logical consistency, for example, serves as a 
“prerequisite for systematic and valid prediction” (Merton, 1968, p. 606). 
 
The necessity of scientific norms usually becomes clear when they are violated. If, for example, 
theoretical terms and concepts are not clearly defined (a normative claim many journal editors make), 
equivocations and misunderstandings may occur, and if results are distorted, wrong consequences can be 
drawn (Weingartner, 2006, p. 59). For example, in a study of articles that used content analysis as a method 
and were published between 1985 and 2010 in three major communication journals—Communication 
Monographs, Journal of Communication and Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly—Lovejoy, 
Watson, Lacy and Riffe (2014), found that “a majority of the articles did not use a census or probability 
reliability sample and were not transparent about the sample selection process” (p. 220). It is not that the 
specific articles studied in these flagship journals failed to demonstrate research norms; rather, it is that 
they illustrated a nonstandard norm of nondisclosure. This nondisclosure might lead to a situation where, 
because of a lack of knowledge, conclusions and inferences are drawn for areas that were not investigated. 
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Gieryn’s (1983) concept of “boundary-work” contends that a field stands out because of the 
characteristics that simultaneously create a social boundary or demarcation in regard to adjacent fields. If one 
wants to gain social recognition in this field, one is better advised to conduct oneself in accordance with the 
collective efforts to set up boundaries, to develop specific norms, and to cultivate a distinctive logic (Waisbord, 
2013). Thus, a field’s autonomy, intellectual authority, contributions to humanity, and resources (financial and 
social) can be strengthened. However, the boundaries of a field like communication research are flexible. These 
boundaries change with the passing of time, and they can vary with regard to the mutability of boundary-
spanning fields, as was apparent in Germany, from the cultural sciences to a rapprochement to sociology. Even 
though Gieryn (1983) developed his concept to distinguish scientists, their work, and their products from those 
of nonscientists (Gieryn, 1983), it can be applied to explain the boundaries and normative differences among 
scientific fields as well. In his conclusion, Gieryn (1983) argues that his concept is “no doubt useful for 
[examining] ideological demarcations of disciplines, specialties or theoretical orientations within science” (p. 
792, emphasis in original). 
 
Inarguably, one can have doubts about the presence of a homogeneous canon of material and 
formal objects, of theories, and of methods of communication research. Certainly, the actions of 
distinctiveness with reference to similar or even competing academic fields have seen changes over time. 
For example, empirical communication research continuously increases its claim for distinction from media 
research and from the humanities (Huber, 2010) by using different theories and methods. Distinction is also 
important, particularly to find answers to the question, what will happen if the distinctive norms of an 
academic field are challenged? 
 
To answer that question, it is important to acknowledge that different academic journals, editors, 
scholarly book publishers, research traditions, and social science research institutes—be they in the 
United States, Europe, or Asia—all monitor the boundaries of academic scholarship in different ways. 
Accordingly, an important component of dealing with norms is group pressure: orienting oneself toward 
the agents of the same group (field) and having the fear of expulsion if the same norms are not observed 
(e.g., by violating the truth and originality norm when plagiarizing in science). It is to Parsons’ (2010) 
credit that he connects the meso-level influence on a scholar with norms. Certain normative standards 
may exist in publishing houses and academic institutions (meso level) that do not have to be explicated. 
“In some societies and groups, almost all normative patterns, including the most important institutions, 
are entirely informally enforced” (Parsons, 2010, p. 157). If the informal norms are not met, moral or 
ethical sanctioning on the part of the agents belonging to the institute will occur. “Deviant behavior 
typically arouses the reaction, on the part of others, of moral indignation” (Parsons, 2010, p. 153). Bunz 
(2005), in a study of communication discipline’s publication conventions, found that if “an editor indicates 
a clear preference for quantitative studies, then scholars favoring quantitative methods are more likely 
to have their manuscripts accepted during the tenure of this editor than scholars favoring, for example, 
rhetorical or ethnographic methods” (p. 717). Boundaries are created and set, and subsequently, new 
conditions or a new generation with new assumptions emerges and breaks from the old boundaries, 
testing “usually tacit assumptions that theorists make about the domains with which they concern 
themselves” (Gouldner, 1970, p. 34). 
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Norms arise within the field and in contradistinction to other fields: “When the goal is 
monopolization of professional authority and resources, boundary-work excludes rivals from within by 
defining them as outsiders” (Gieryn, 1983, p. 792, emphasis in original). Gieryn (1983) identifies expansion, 
monopolization, and protection of autonomy as “generic features” (p. 792) of professionalization. The actors 
in the field will be reinforcing and justifying the norms of their profession in the face of threats, and they 
will try to keep their privileges, such as research grants, within the autonomous group. Gieryn (1983) refers 
to it as “antinomies in the institution of science” (p. 792). We refer to it as contradicting norms that are 
defended by different agents and groups in the subfields of the communication research: pureness versus 
application of research, objectivity versus subjectivity, exactness versus estimation, and democratic 
confirmation versus elitist confirmation. 
 
With regard to the influence of extrascientific norms on scientific practice (metatheoretical level), 
the issue gets more contentious: In the first phase of the scientific research process, norms are constitutive 
for the identification of a social problem (Weber, 1949) and thus have a heuristic function. Without guiding 
principles, some questions would not arise. For instance, without taking up the guiding principle of 
democratic jurisdiction, it would be irrelevant for scholars to analyze if a judge or state attorney acts 
according to the media logic (Scheufele, 2011). An article about the fact that social media and Web TV 
increase audience segmentation will have to answer whether this is “good” or “bad” from a normative point 
of view. And one takes a different normative starting point if one analyzes the role of the media from a 
watchdog perspective or from a lapdog view of submissive media (Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1995). 
 
There are existential and normative background assumptions that in fact cannot be separated from 
each other. The normative background assumptions are “beliefs about their moral value, their goodness or 
badness” (Gouldner, 1970, p. 32). Hence, research is carried out on the basis of prior assumptions. These 
are incorporated into a lifelong process (for a Bourdieusian perspective on this issue, see Rothenberger, 
Auer, & Pratt, 2017). Gouldner (1970) defines them as follows: 
 
They are affectively-laden cognitive tools that are developed early in the course of our 
socialization into a particular culture and are built deeply into our character structure. 
They are therefore likely to change with changes in modal or “social character,” to vary 
with changes in socialization experiences and practices, and therefore to differ with 
different age or peer groups. (p. 32) 
 
The influence of extrascientific norms and values, however, becomes problematic with regard to 
the theoretical level. Weber’s value-freedom postulate resonates with this level. But, whereas he and his 
followers contend that “value-orientations may . . . have an impact on the way a question is objectively 
formulated, but the question itself can be dealt with without the interference of value judgments” (Albert, 
1976, p. 175), we argue that this obscures the fact that both theories and empirical research are 
normatively shaped (e.g., Zima, 2007). Following Zima (2007), we therefore argue that in the social 
sciences, and, thus, in communication research in particular, “value-freedom only makes sense if it is 
interpreted . . . as critical distance towards one’s own ideology . . . and towards one’s own discourse” (p. 
61). This becomes even more relevant with regard to the fact that scholars have the power to establish 
and share norms (theoretical level of normativity). With regard to the close connection between research 
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and education, consider, for example, that journalism is a research discipline and a training area—scholars 
let their findings be known in seminars and in literature of academic journalism education (Weaver & 
McCombs, 1980). In this context, then, normative ideas enunciated in research enter social practice (for 
a critical view on this, see Blumler & Cushion, 2014). This makes it even more important to stress the 
normative influences on research results and the consequences drawn therefrom for social practice. 
 
But why would scholars need to explain constantly in their works that their studies are based on 
democratic ideas, especially when their work is likely to be perceived by a community that shares the same 
idea of democracy? It is primarily because it may exclude from the argument certain audiences who may 
not share the same idea of democracy indicated in a study. This argument takes us to Weber (1949), who 
asserts, 
 
It has been and remains true that a systematically correct scientific proof in the social 
sciences, if it is to achieve its purpose, must be acknowledged as correct even by a 
Chinese—or—more precisely stated—it must constantly strive to attain this goal. (p. 58) 
 
Yet, some researchers assume that what they think the media should be or should do in 
democratic Western societies is transferrable to a global context, regardless of a multitude of restrictions 
in socioeconomic and security environments in which the media in some countries have to function (e.g., 
Ward, 2010). To demand that media equality, diversity, or impartiality should offer a normative base to 
globalized journalism means to turn against or underestimate the manifold normative approaches 
practiced in other parts of the world; in Asia and Africa, for example, envelope journalism is standard 
practice. To be sure, the demand to recognize other normative approaches is a normative stance in itself. 
 
There is an abundance of literature on the “Global North/Global South” complex of problems that 
underpin the inequality of country representation in communication science. Curran and Park (2000) write 
about “a growing reaction against the self-absorption and parochialism of much Western media theory” (p. 
3). The results of Demeter’s (2017) network analysis of leading publications in communication and media 
studies journals show that “most of the scientific publications are written by authors from a very few winner-
countries, and the real loser of the field is obviously the CEE region” (p. 402). These dominant countries 
“represent only 9% of the international community, but they have almost 90% of the articles in Q1-level 
journals” (p. 419). It goes without saying that the norms inherent to our discipline are shaped by (English-
language native) representatives of these “winner countries,” taking into account that 84% of all managing 
editors of 40 communication journals were from the United States (Lauf, 2005). With Wiedemann and Meyen 
(2016), we can conclude—drawing on the terminology of Pierre Bourdieu—that “the field’s power pole is still 
a U.S.-centered enterprise” (p. 1489). 
 
Media systems, as well as academic systems and communication styles, differ tremendously across 
world regions. A strong commitment to the principles of democracy is a prominent example where Western 
scholars are influenced by ancient (Greek) philosophical tradition—in contrast to many other de-Westernized 
approaches around the world (Grüne & Ulrich, 2012). Lauk (2015) gives the example of Central and Eastern 
European countries in which 
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the efforts at exporting the philosophy and elements of the liberal (Anglo-American) model 
of journalism were not successful . . . although this model has been generally accepted 
by media practitioners and theorists as the dominant ideal of a responsible and 
professional journalism. (p. 1) 
 
However, the purely Western perspective was not able to entirely explain the media development in the 
transforming societies. 
 
While reviewing different publications in journalism and the media, Josephi (2005) also found that 
Anglo-American (democracy) models are dominant—in the sense of “quality journalism [as] independent, 
accurate, open to appraisal, edited and uncensored” (in Shapiro, 2010, p. 143). However, normatively 
defining journalism in relation to democracy (theoretical level) has consequences for communicators in 
societies that adhere to other normative claims; professional communicators in many countries would then 
be seen not as journalists but as simple information providers (Josephi, 2005). As such, “normative 
expectations skew results and veil actual practice” (Josephi, 2005, p. 575). For instance, in the socialist 
norm and value system of the former USSR and the German Democratic Republic, we find different 
assumptions about the closeness and role of journalism with regard to that particular political system 
(Sektion Journalistik, 1979). Hence, claims on a theoretical level are problematic, particularly when a scholar 
does not explain the normative background that led thereto—whether she or he argues from a libertarian, 
utilitarian, socialist, or another viewpoint. 
 
During the course of a research study, attempts are made to identify and deactivate the subjectivity 
of the research by including empirical testing procedures or consensual validation of theories, intercoder 
reliability tests, and interpersonal criticisms found in reviews. Still, despite all these efforts, extrascientific 
values and norms cannot be excluded from scientific practice: “We cannot rob the scientist of his partisanship 
without also robbing him of his humanity, and we cannot suppress or destroy his value judgments without 
destroying him as a human being and as a scientist” (Popper, 1976, p. 97, emphasis in original). But what 
scientists can do is make such judgments explicit. 
 
Some authors already do, as an informal review of recent journal articles suggests (and it might even 
be the case that book authors provide more [often] space to normative reflections). In mid-November 2018, 
we examined the abstracts and the introductory section of the first 20 articles posted on the website of the 
International Journal of Communication. In seven articles, we found implicit or explicit statements of 
normativity. (We noted that there was a fine line between both forms of statements.) Some articles implicitly 
criticized conditions such as the imbalance in global media flows, with a continuing dominance of productions 
from the Global North (Iordache & Livémont, 2018). One article explicitly advocated the norm of the media’s 
watchdog role and “the media’s role as a global forth estate” (Berglez & Gearing, 2018, p. 4573). Only one 
study admitted that it would be “a normative study of broadcast regulators in the Arab World” (Zaid, 2018, p. 
4401), thus acknowledging the norms of regulatory institutions as a research object. In other articles, norms 
like fairness, confidentiality, honesty, and helpfulness were scrutinized. One article asked normatively how 
emerging democracies can engage rural and mobile citizens in deliberative democracy (Hahn, 2018, p. 4379), 
once again adopting an avowedly “Western” perspective. 
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A Typology of Scientific and Extrascientific Norms 
 
What is largely missing in contemporary communication research is a theoretical framework for 
explaining the influences that emanate from different levels of normativity, a framework that could inform 
a scholar’s normativity at theoretical and metatheoretical levels. Therefore, we propose a theoretical 
framework while building on the social integrative multilevel approach presented by German sociologist 
Schimank (1996, 2010). 
 
Similar to the argument of Giddens (1984), Schimank (1996) states that human action is influenced 
by social structures that are simultaneously reproduced by that action. However, he makes analytical 
distinctions among these social structures with regard to the micro, meso, and macro levels of society. This 
delineation of social structures helps us understand the different occurrences of norms. The following 
framework can help a researcher explicate her or his own, as well as others’, normativity. Referring to 
Schimank (1996), we assume that scientific practice on all the aforementioned levels is guided by social 
structures. 
 
Macro level: Scientific practice is influenced by the logic of the scientific system, the so-called 
subsystemic orientation horizon. This horizon constitutes specific rationalities of action through a binary code 
(Schimank, 1996). Like any other scientific discipline, communication research epistemologically commits to 
the binary code of science—that is, according to Luhmann’s (1995) systems theory, “true”/”false.” It affects 
the researcher, but also the publishing or funding processes by its postulated norms of scientific practice like 
scientometry, the adherence to the double-blind peer review system that checks the theoretical, analytical, 
and methodological soundness of scientific articles. Influences are further social norms and value of a specific 
political or economic system, be it, for instance, liberal or socialist (Ritzer, 1991). 
 
Meso level: At this level, research is influenced by institutionalized normative expectations of 
professions and institutions, such as various laws and codes of conduct, but also by informal normative 
expectations such as rites or manners (Schimank, 2010). The more complex a social system is, the more 
norms and rules become institutionalized in contracts, conventions, laws, or statutes to ensure synchrony 
of modes of behavior (Lamnek, 2002). Norms are thus part of the (national, organizational, or group) culture 
and are assumed to be transmitted through socialization (Opp, 2001). At the meso level, there is an 
overarching importance of theoretical traditions or methodological preferences of a scholar’s institution or 
school of thought across institutions, as was the case in the Frankfurt School, the Birmingham School, and 
the Chicago School (e.g., Bryant & Miron, 2004; Ritzer, 1991; Rosengren, 1993). For instance, the 
quantitative research orientation of the Columbia School to which Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Elihu Katz belonged 
stood in contrast to the Chicago School of Robert E. Park, George Herbert Mead, and Kurt and Gladys Lang 
that followed more qualitative paths to exploring social (communication) problems. Similarly, scholars 
belonging to these two opposing schools of thought follow and coin specific guiding principles. Differences 
are visible even in the faculty and student recruitment criteria of these schools because only scholars with 
similar normative backgrounds are accepted. Within each group, implicit or explicit norms are mutually 
reinforced by its followers. Institutionalized normative expectations also help explain why communication 
scholars belonging to a certain school of thought deal extensively with certain societal problems that are in 
sync with the objectives of their institutions, while leaving other equally important issues untouched or 
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responding to them only marginally. Throughout the history of communication studies, we observe certain 
adjustment processes aimed at mainstreaming communication research. As Potthoff and Weischenberg 
(2014) state, “Communication science, e.g., has to query, why its main focus traditionally is on mass 
communication even though interpersonal communication constitutes a substantial part of the occurring 
communication as well” (p. 273, emphasis in original). Critics have also raised concerns regarding the 
selection and application of methods by scholars for communication research, as Meyen (2012) observes: 
“Quantitative methods promise recognition in both academia and industry and therefore more symbolic 
capital than purely theoretical pieces or a study based on in-depth interviews only” (p. 2390). Löblich (2010) 
terms the tendency of contemporary research to prove scientific statements with quantitative data as the 
“norms of the empirical analytical research” (p. 84). This leads to the assumption “that existing research 
traditions operate like a norm which defines research outside this tradition as more or less unimportant” 
(Potthoff & Weischenberg, 2014, p. 273). Hence, the selection of a topic, theory, and research method for 
a scientific study also influences the chances of its success in a publication process. In addition, research 
traditions shape the funding programs for scholars and vice versa: “Scholars working in interpersonal, 
nonverbal, or everyday communication are . . . familiar with this problem. ‘Grants are rare’ in those areas, 
said Steve Duck [an ICA fellow Meyen interviewed]” (Meyen, 2012, p. 2393). Thus, organizational normative 
influences on the meso level shape the trajectories in communication research. 
 
Micro level: Personal characteristics, attitudes, ideas, and role understandings of a scholar, as well as 
her or his interactions with other scholars, are influential when it comes to norms on the micro level. In his 
interviews with ICA fellows, Meyen (2012) observes that the “focus on making a difference”—which he later 
(Meyen, 2013, p. 118) identifies as a norm in U.S. communication studies—“was . . . strengthened by the 
values instilled by a religious education and the idea of contributing socially, learned early in life” (p. 2388). 
The mere attention to a certain social problem is rooted in the scholar’s own normative framework. Similarly, 
membership in a political party or in a confessional binding may normatively influence the research design and 
interpretation of research findings. Whoever decides to investigate ombudspeople on editorial teams takes the 
view that they are either necessary or not. After an analysis of the case of German scholar Gerhard Maletzke, 
Lacasa-Mas, Meyen, and Löblich (2015) highlight “the importance of reviewing a scientific study in the context 
of the biography of its author and the structures of science” (p. 101). Waisbord (2013) also adheres to the 
opinion that “normative limitations and contributions of professionalism cannot be dissociated from specific 
historical and political contexts” (p. 9). 
 
In interactions, a set of normative interaction patterns offers a frame of reference for the meanings 
shared by the agents. This, at the same time, again stabilizes the pattern of the interaction. This interaction 
can take place among individuals, organizations, or fields, as well as among systems. The cultural patterns 
or standards always codetermine these interactions. In sum, norms and hereditary and environmental 
factors influence action (Funk, 2009). This was palpable vis-à-vis German communication studies during the 
Nazi era, when an extreme group pressure demanded conformity with the then-valid norms, such as the 
notion of the press as the leader of the masses. Accordingly, an important component in dealing with norms 
is group pressure: orienting oneself toward the agents of the same group (field) and fearing expulsion if the 
same norms are not observed (e.g., by violating the truth and originality norm when plagiarizing in science). 
Certain normative standards may exist in institutions (meso level) that do not have to be explicated. “In 
some societies and groups, almost all normative patterns, including the most important institutions, are 
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entirely informally enforced” (Parsons, 2010, p. 157). If the informal norms are not met, moral or ethical 
sanctioning on the part of the agents belonging to the institute will occur. “Deviant behavior typically arouses 
the reaction, on the part of others, of moral indignation” (Parsons, 2010, p. 153). 
 
The individual behavior of scholars influenced by norms at the micro, meso, and macro levels 
therefore reproduces or modifies the norms that then again inform individual behavior. Here, Schimank 
builds on Giddens’ (1993) “duality of structure,” which asserts that structures are a medium and result of 
action. This conceptualization helps explain why norms are transitory as normative principles continuously 
appear and disappear. They are produced, negotiated, rehearsed, and perpetuated—and from time to time 
also negated and abolished. This “oblivionism” depends on whether scientists turn toward (reproduction of 
norms) or turn away from previous normative research traditions (norm change). 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
“The broad church of public communication . . . is an inescapably normative domain” (Blumer & 
Cushion, 2014, p. 261). This is why we proposed a way to unpack the influences of norms for best practices 
in communication research. We have attempted to demonstrate that scholars take a normative stance in 
different phases of a research process, and we have demonstrated why it is problematic that communication 
scholars seldom reflect it. A discussion about norms and values is both necessary and possible because it 
elaborates and explicates the premises on which researchers often base their work (Rothenberger et al., 
2017; Weber, 1949). In this article, we outlined a scheme based on the three aforementioned levels that 
can help scholars reflect on and project their own or others’ normative stance. The integrative 
conceptualization of the influence of norms helps guide responses to those questions at the following three 
levels. 
 
Macro level: At this level, scholars can ask which social norms they adhere to. In this context, it is 
also important to clarify the scope and conditions of the study and its theory to protect it “from being tested 
under conditions never intended by the theorist” (Markovsky, 2005, p. 832). Freelon (2015) provides a good 
example of how to introduce general normative expectations guiding one’s study: 
 
Studies of political discussions online have been dominated by approaches that focus 
exclusively on deliberation, ignoring other equally relevant communication norms. This 
study conducts a normative assessment of discussion spaces in two prominent web 
platforms . . . applying the norms of communitarianism, liberal individualism, and 
deliberation. (p. 772) 
 
Meso level: Scholars can ask which norms and values of their research institutions, research 
groups, or schools of thought in communication studies or in the broader scope of social sciences they follow. 
As noted by Lacasa-Mas and colleagues (2015), scientific investigations are “influenced by the social location 
of thinkers” (p. 102). This locating is heavily influenced by the scientific environment, by the surrounding 
institutional body, and by the school of thought inspiring a respective department. One possibility to 
explicate it is presented by Stromer-Galley (2014): “The philosophical orientation of this book aligns with 
the normative vision set forth by Benjamin Barber in Strong Democracy” (p. 4). 
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Micro level: At this level, scholars can clarify the individual norms and values they adhere to, for 
example, in how far their upbringing or their cooperation with other authors influences their own guiding 
principles. Coleman (2013) gives an example on how one can start with an article and lay out one’s 
normative background: “At the normative core of the analysis set out in the following pages is the 
assumption that, like any other complex communicative act, the expression of preferences calls for affective 
investment” (p. viii). 
 
As soon as scholars become aware of their personal (micro level), institutional (meso level), and 
social (macro level) normative backgrounds, their respective disciplines engage in dialogue with themselves 
and diminish what Rosengren (1993) calls “fragmentation” or “isolated frog ponds” (p. 9) with little 
productive croaking among them. The theoretical framework can thus help clarify normativity regarding 
issues that relate to different perspectives, research traditions, theories, and methodologies in 
communication scholarship worldwide. It can be a tool that connects analytical dots across subfields in 
communication studies, a tool to compare, bridge, and synthesize frameworks, if open discourse about 
normativity in communication scholarship is made possible and taken seriously. However, norms becoming 
explicit could lead to more lines being drawn and more dialogues being muted, as often happened in the 
divide between critical scholars and empirical social scientists; this should be avoided. 
 
Furthermore, as scholars are continuously asked to communicate their findings and (policy) 
recommendations to the public, politicians, and educators, it will not suffice to make normative implications 
explicit purely in scientific discourse, at academic conferences, or in research journals. Rather, scholars also 
need to address the issue of normativity with regard to transferring scientific knowledge to the public. In 
none of these cases will normative assertions narrow a scholar’s claim to objectivity; rather, they will 
undergird her or his standpoint and suggestions—for example, voting for a public service broadcasting 
system, arguing for specific times during which children are allowed to watch television (perhaps 
unsupervised), or advocating two-way symmetrical communications. 
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